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SUMMARY 
On June 15 and 18, 1989, voters went to the polls in the 12 European 
Community (EC) member countries to choose the third popularly-elected 
European Parliament. While the results of the elections will have an 
important impact on EC policies and the domestic politics in several countries, 
they mark few great political shifts in Europe, aside from an unusually strong 
showing for Green parties in most member states. 
The timing of the elections is perhaps as significant as their outcome. 
The Parliament may be at a crossroads in its development from a mere 
consultative assembly to a body having some of the attributes of national 
legislatures. The 1987 Single European Act, which laid out' the plan to 
establish a single European market by 1992, also outlined a "cooperation 
procedure" that gives the Parliament the potential to veto or amend EC 
legislation in certain circumstances. Some observers believe this limited 
legislative power of Parliament may eventually be expanded to a full right of 
co-decision with the Council of Ministers and the Commission. Encouraged 
by its increased legislative role and improving public image, the Parliament 
has also been using its limited but significant budgetary and supervisory 
powers more assertively. But while the Parliament's powers are growing, it 
still lacks key powers possessed by national legislatures, including full control 
over the budget, the power to tax and the right to initiate legislation. The 
Parliament is unlikely to receive these powers in the short term because they 
raise the question of the national sovereignty of the member states. 
The evolution of the Parliament's role in the EC is especially important 
because this Parliament will play an important role in establishment of a 
unified West European market due to be completed by the end of 1992. The 
implementation of the 1992 plan could have a substantial impact on U.S. 
trade with Western Europe. Parliament's status as a directly-elected body 
may make it more sensitive to protectionist pressures than other EC 
institutions, especially if protectionist legislation can be seen as demonstrating 
concern for other popular issues, including public health and the environment. 
American policy toward the EC will increasingly have to take into account the 
emergence of multiple decision centers within the Community. 
In the longer term, the Parliament could play an important role in a 
politically integrated Western Europe. This development, if it were to occur, 
would obviously have a profound impact on U.S.-Western European relations. 
Because of the European Parliament's increasing influence over matters of 
interest to the United States, the Congress may see the Parliament as an 
increasingly valuable interlocutor in the next few years. The value of the 
relationship is enhanced by the institutional affinities of the two bodies. 
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THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: 
AN ANALYSIS OF ITS EVOLVING ROLE 
AND OF THE JUNE 1989 ELECTIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
On June 15 and 18, 1989, voters went to the polls in the 12 European 
Community (EC) member countries to choose the third popularly-elected 
European Parliament. These elections are especially important because this 
Parliament will play an important role in establishment of a unified West 
European market due to be completed by the end of 1992. The implementa-
tion of the 1992 plan could have a substantial impact on U.S. trade with 
Western Europe and on U.S.-West European relations in general. In the long 
term, there is the possibility that the Parliament could play an important role 
in a politically integrated Western Europe. For tltese reasons, the Congress 
may see the European Parliament as an increasingly valuable interlocutor on 
a wide range of issues affecting U.S.-West European relations. 
This paper begins with an overview of the role of the European 
Parliament in EC institutions. Then the results of June 1989 European 
elections are addressed an_<L their implications for current EC policies are 
discussed. Finally, the report deals with the broader question of the 
likelihood of an increase in the Parliament's powers and the effect this would 
have on U.S.-West European relations and the Parliament's relationship with 
the U.S. Congress. 
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BACKGROUND 
The European Parliament is a unicameral body with 518 members, 
elected every five years by voters in the 12 EC countries. The seats are 
allocated by country as follows: Great Britain, West Germany, France and 
Italy receive 81 seats each, Spain receives 60 and The Netherlands has 25. 
Belgium, Portugal and Greece have 24 each. Denmark receives 16 seats, 
Ireland 15 and Luxembourg 6 seats. 
Despite its name, the European Parliament is not quite a parliament in 
the conventional sense of the word. It currently has characteristics both of 
a true legislature and a consultative assembly. This situation is partly due 
to the continuing evolution of the European Parliament in EC institutions. 
The European Parliament has been in existence since 1952, when it was 
known as the Common Assembly. From 1952 to 1979 its members were 
members of national parliaments appointed by their governments to serve in 
the European Parliament. Its chief role was to advise the Commission and 
the Council on EC legislation. Often it functioned more as a symbol of a 
nascent European identity than as an equal partner with the other EC 
institutions. 
Most observers agree that the first popular election of the European 
Parliament in 1979 marked a turning point in its history. The Parliament 
drew a new sense of legitimacy from its direct election. This encouraged it to 
use its modest powers more aggressively in ways that have had an important 
impact on the Community's development. To cite only two of the most 
prominent examples, the Parliament's rejection of the entire Community 
budget in 1980 and 1985 eventually led the EC Commission and member 
governments to make needed reforms in the Community's finances and 
budget. And the Parliament's 1984 adoption of a draft treaty for a European 
Union spurred the EC Commission to produce a 1985 White Paper on 
completing the EC internal market. In 1987, the twelve EC member 
governments approved the Single European Act, which set forth the 1992 
single market plan outlined in the White Paper, albeit in a less ambitious way 
than envisioned by the Parliament. The Single European Act also gave 
Parliament new powers over EC legislation that, combined with the urgency 
imparted to European integration by the 1992 plan, has further increased 
Parliament's activism. 
But while the European Parliament is accumulating power and gaining 
public respect, it should be noted that it still does not possess many of the 
prerogatives normally associated with a national parliament. It does not have 
the power to tax, does not have full control over the EC budget, nor can it 
initiate legislation, for example. 
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POWERS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
Legislative Powers 
The main role of the Parliament in EC legislation has been to advise the 
Commission and the Council. The Commission is both the initiator of 
legislative proposals and the executor of EC laws. It is composed of 17 
members, who are appointed by their governments for four year terms but are 
pledged to represent the Community's interest and not to receive instructions 
from the national governments. The Council of Ministers, on the other hand, 
represents the national interests and sovereignty of each country. It is 
composed of government ministers from each member country, and its 
membership changes with the issue on the agenda: agriculture ministers when 
farm policy is discussed, and finance ministers when taxes are discussed, for 
example. Its role is to make the final decision on whether Commission 
proposals become law; it can accept or reject proposals, but cannot amend 
them, except by unanimous vote.1 
In theory, the Commission is required to ask for the Parliament's advice 
before the Council of Ministers can decide on proposed legislation, but only 
in certain key areas. These include the free movement of goods, the common 
agricultural policy, freedom of establishment, transport policy, environmental 
policy and social policy. In practice, the consultation procedure is extended 
to nearly all EC legislation. While the Commission is not obliged to follow 
the Parliament's advice, the Parliament can exert some influence by delaying 
a vote on proposed legislation until the Commission announces its position on 
each amendment suggested by the Parliament, or, if its amendments are not 
accepted, by sending the proposal _back to committee, where it may stay for 
a maximum of two months. 
The Single European Act of 1987 greatly strengthened Parliament's 
legislative powers by instituting a complex "cooperation procedure" between 
the Parliament and the other EC institutions. It involves two "readings" of 
legislative proposals dealing with the completion of the internal market, social 
policy, regional policy and technology policy. The first reading is identical to 
the consultation procedure outlined above, but instead of definitively accepting 
or rejecting the proposal, the Council merely adopts a tentative "common 
position" by a qualified majority.2 The proposal then goes back to the 
1 For details on the EC decision-making structure as a whole, see U.S. 
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. The European 
Community: Its Structure and Development, by Martin Elling. [Washington] 
August 31, 1988. 63 p. CRS Report 88-620 F. 
2 Since the passage of the Single European Act in 1987, the Council of 
Ministers decides most issues by a weighted majority voting system. 54 votes 
out of a total of 76 are required to pass legislation. The 76 votes are 
(continued ... ) 
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Parliament for a second reading. The Parliament may accept, reject or amend 
the proposal by an absolute majority of all of its members (260 votes). If the 
Parliament rejects the proposal, the Council can override the vote only by a 
unanimous decision that is often difficult to achieve. The fate of amendments 
to the proposal depends on the Commission's stance. If the Commission 
accepts them, the Council may adopt them by a qualified majority. On the 
other hand, if the Commission rejects them, the Council may accept them only 
by a unanimous vote. 
While this complicated procedure has expanded Parliament's influence 
in the EC decision-making process somewhat, it falls far short of full 
legislative powers. In effect, the cooperation procedure gives the Parliament 
substantial power only if it can ally itself with other institutions. The 
Parliament can veto a piece of legislation if it can secure the support of at 
least one member country in the Council to block the unanimous Council vote 
needed to override the Parliament's veto. Likewise, Parliament's amendments 
to legislation are most likely to make their way into law only if they are 
accepted by the Commission. Some observers feel that the cooperation 
procedure is a transitional device that may give way to a power of co-decision 
with the Commission and Council. The Parliament has this power in one 
area already; it can veto the applications of countries to join the EC and also 
approves and renews association agreements with non-EC countries. 
Budgetary Powers 
The Parliament has limited but significant budgetary powers. It cannot 
control what are termed "compulsory expenditures" that directly result from 
the terms of the Rome Treaty that established the EC. This restriction deals 
chiefly with the common agricultural policy, which accounts for nearly two-
thirds of the budget.8 About one-quarter of the budget falls into the "non-
compulsory" category. This grouping includes money for regional, social, 
energy, technology and environmental policies. Parliament may make 
amendments to this part of the budget by a vote of three-fifths of its members 
on second reading. However, it can only increase expenditures in these areas 
by a fixed percentage, set by the Commission according to formulas that take 
into account the growth rates in the member states and other factors. 
In addition to the power of amendment, the Parliament may reject the 
entire budget by a two-thirds majority of the members present, as long as this 
2( ... continued) 
distributed among the member countries in rough proportion to the size of 
their populations. Some issues, especially major EC appointments and 
institutional questions, require a unanimous vote. 
8 The size of the EC budget in 1988 was slightly under 44 billion ECUs 
($51 billion). Europa Yearbook 1989. London: Europa Publications Ltd, 1989. 
p. 150. 
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two-thirds majority also amounts to a majority of all the members of the 
Parliament (260 votes). It has used this power three times since 1979, twice 
rejecting a Community budget (in 1980 and 1985) and once rejecting a 
supplementary budget (in 1982). 
Supervisory Powers 
These powers consist mainly of the right to pose oral or written 
questions to members of the Commission, who are required to respond to 
them. While the Council is not required by the EC ,Treaty to reply to 
Parliament's questions, it bas in fact consented to do so. The Commission 
and Council responded to over 4,000 written and oral questions asked by 
members of the Parliament in 1987. 
The Parliament also has the power to dismiss the Commission by a vote 
of no confidence by a two-thirds majority of the members present, and a 
majority of all the members of the Parliament (260 votes). The Parliament 
has voted on several no-confidence motions, all defeated by overwhelming 
margins. 
HOW THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT WORKS 
The workings of the European Parliament are similar.to those of national 
legislatures in several respects; there are political groupings that devise 
legislative strategy and try to enforce discipline, committees that do most of 
the legislative ground work, and floor debates and votes on legislation. But 
there are also quite a few ways in which the Parliament differs from national 
bodies, many of which limit its effectiveness. 
Political Groups 
While members of the European Parliament are elected as members of 
their national political parties in separate national elections, they are 
organized within the Parliament by ideologically-based political groups that 
cut across national differences. The establishment and strengthening of these 
transnational groups is encouraged by rules for committee assignments and 
the allocation of funds fpr staff support that favor large groups composed of 
several nationalities. In the previous Parliament, these European political 
"parties" have included for example a Socialist group (the largest), a 
Communist group, a mainly Christian Democratic group (called the European 
People's Party), a Liberal (free market-oriented) group, various conservative 
groups, a far-right group and a "Rainbow Group" composed chiefly of Greens. 
Each new Parliament sees some realignments in the groups, with some groups 
breaking up and others for:tning, but the groups are in general quite stable 
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because they represent, in a rough way, true trans-European ideological 
"families." 4 
Like political parties, the groups play important roles in choosing the 
leadership of the Parliament, making committee assignments, and setting the 
agenda of the full Parliament. On the other hand, these groups lack the 
party discipline that is customary in national parliaments. This is partly 
because the groupings have little control over campaign financing, designation 
of candidates and other tools that could be used to encourage party unity, and 
partly because Parliament's attitudes on many issues are still conditioned 
more by nationality than ideological leanings. In addition, the groups vary in 
ideological coherence. The Socialist and Christian Democrats (European 
People's Party) have perhaps the most cohesive groups, while the Communist 
group has broken apart because of the great differences between the moderate 
Italian Communists and the hard-line French party. 
The Parliament and Its Committees 
In an average month, the Parliament's work is divided into two weeks of 
committee meetings, one week of plenary meetings of the full Parliament and 
one week of political group meetings. One of the key problems the 
Parliament faces is that these activities do not take place in one location. 
The committees meet in Brussels, the full sessions of the Parliament in the 
French city of Strasbourg, while the Parliament's administrative Secretariat 
is housed in Luxembourg. (The political group meetings can be held anywhere, 
but are held most often in Brussels or Strasbourg.) This situation means that 
the Parliament must speng a considerable amount of time and expense 
travelling between these locations. Most members would prefer to move all 
activities to Brussels, where the other key EC institutions are located, but 
these moves have been blocked so far by the governments of France and 
Luxembourg. 
As in Congress, the committees play a key role in the legislative process. 
They provide detailed reports on legislation proposed by the Commission 
before it goes to the floor for a vote by the Parliament as a whole. They also 
prepare reports on their own initiative for consideration by the Parliament. 
There are now 18 standing committees and a few ad hoe committees that deal 
with a wide assortment of issues, ranging from political affairs, the budget, 
and external economic relations to social policy, women's rights and civil 
rights. There are also parliamentary "delegations" that handle relations with 
other parliaments. (The largest and most prestigious of these handles relations 
with the United States.) Committee membership and assignments to produce 
4 The most likely realignments in the new Parliament are a break-up of 
the Communist group (into an Italian-led moderate group and a French-led 
hard-line group) and the formation of a French and German-dominated Green 
group that might break away from the Rainbow group. 
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reports in the committee's name are parcelled out to reflect the weight of the 
groupings inside the Parliament. 
The assignment of individual members to these duties for two and a half 
year terms is made by each political grouping. Chairmanships, also assigned 
by political groupings, are particularly important, since the chairmen, like 
their U.S. congressional counterparts, effectively control their committees' 
agenda. However, there are several other ways in which the Parliament's 
operation differs from that of Congress. The subcommittee system is not well-
established; there are only four of them now. Informal task forces are more 
common than subcommittees at present. In addition, public hearings of expert 
testimony are still rare for European Parliamentary committees. Finally, a 
critical difference between Congress and the European Parliament is the lack 
of staff support. As in most national parliaments in Europe, each member is 
given funds only for two aides, including a secretary. Committee staffing is 
also very weak. This situation puts the Parliament in a difficult position 
when it tries to compete with the more generously staffed Commission and 
the Council. 
Plenary Sessions 
The full Parliament meets only five days each month in Strasbourg. In 
this time the Parliament debates, amends and votes on committee reports and 
various resolutions. In addition, members may also pose oral questions to 
Commission and Council members. A President, elected by the Parliament, 
presides over the sessions. He is assisted by fourteen Vice-Presidents, who are 
drawn from the largest political groups. The President and the Vice 
Presidents form a "Bureau" that deals mainly with the Parliament>s 
administration and questions of organization. An "enlarged Bureau" that 
includes the leaders of the political groups prepares the agenda for the full 
sessions of the Parliament. This agenda is usually very long; there are usually 
50 to 60 points to be addressed, each requiring at least 20 minutes of debate. 
In addition, six to eight hours are needed to vote on between 500 and 1,000 
amendments to legislation. This means that the Parliament may have to vote 
on amendments at a rate of 100 per hour.6 This situation has led to calls for 
setting aside more days for plenary sessions of the Parliament, preferably in 
Brussels, where the committees meet. The number of resolutions considered 
might also be reduced, especially since many of these have a mainly symbolic 
character. · -
6 Buchan, David. "Europe's Wandering Parliamentarians Start Down New 
Path," Financial Times, 2 June 1989, 4. 
CRS-9 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS OF 1989 
The results of the June 1989 elections above all reflected the 
preoccupation of voters in the 12 EC countries with national concerns, despite 
the fact that the European Parliament will be concerned mainly with EC 
issues. 6 This phenomenon, which also occurred during the 1984 election, is 
partly due to the way in which the Parliament is elected. The fact that 
members of the European Parliament are elected within each country, from 
slates put forth by national parties, according to national electoral laws 
inevitably brings national issues to the forefront during a campaign. Many 
observers believe that both candidates and electorate saw the election more as 
a referendum on current national governments' policies than a debate on 
sometimes rather esoteric EC issues, which in any case evince little public 
excitement and are often poorly understood. In many countries, the result 
was perceived as a mild setback to the national government. 
In Great Britain and West Germany, the consequences of the vote may 
be more serious. In Britain, the Conservative government's decisive defeat at 
the hands of the Labor opposition and the breakthrough of the British Greens 
is attributed by some to Prime Minister Thatcher's strong opposition to 
further European integration. But since Labor itself is not united in 
wholehearted support of greater British integration into Europe, others point 
to the unpopularity of some Conservative policies and bickering within the 
government itself as explanations for Labor's victory. 
In West Germany, the far-right Republican party scored a breakthrough, 
winning over 7 percent of the vote, ensuring it of six seats in the new 
European Parliament. Both the ruling Christian Democrats and the 
opposition SPD received disappointing tallies. Perhaps more troublesome for 
West German leaders than the impressive performance of the far-right 
Republicans is the potential fragmentation of the West German party system. 
The fact that there seem now to be five parties of widely varying points of 
view capable of winning seats in the West German parliament could make 
difficult the formation of a government in Bonn after the December 1990 
federal elections, even with participation of "extreme" parties like the Greens 
and Republicans.7 
One feature of the elections that spanned national boundaries was low 
voter turnout. In the 12 EC states, only 58.5% of registered votes cast a 
ballot, a low figure when compared with national elections in Europe and 
slightly less than the level of participation during the last European election 
6 See Appendix for distribution of seats in the new Parliament by 
European political grouping and the election results for each member country. 
7 A possible alternative to this situation would be a "grand coalition" 
between the Social Democrats and Christian Democrats. 
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in 1984. Participation was lowest in Great Britain (36%), highest in countries 
having a national election at the same time as the European vote and/or 
where the voting is obligatory. France (48.9%) recorded a near-record low for 
a nation-wide election. Limited public knowledge and enthusiasm about the 
European Parliament's duties may be responsible for this phenomenon, which 
has been noted in the two previous European elections in 1979 and 1984. 
Another transnational phenomenon was the strong showing of Green 
parties in nearly every European country. The most important gains were 
made by Greens in France and Britain. The French Greens captured 11 % of 
the vote and 9 seats, while their British counterparts won 14% of the vote 
but no seats, due to the British "winner-take-all" electoral system. Green 
parties also did well in West Germany, Belgium and Italy. Some observers 
attributed the Greens' striking successes to the public's increased interest in 
environmental issues and a recognition that European institutions may be 
uniquely suited to addressing these problems, which cannot be solved merely 
on the national level. Others pointed out that voters may also have seen the 
election as a chance to cast a protest vote in a contest perceived as less 
"serious" than a national election. This would have allowed them to vote for 
the appealing image of the Greens, without having to endorse anti-NATO 
and anti-economic growth positions that might otherwise be unpopular. This 
protest vote explanation might also account for the substantial support for 
far-right parties in France, Belgium, West Germany and Italy. 
As a whole, the new Parliament is slightly further to the left ideologically 
than the previous one. In the previous Parliament, centrist and conservative 
parties had a majority of about 20 seats in the 518-member body. If one 
places the Greens with the Socialists and Communists, the left has a 
theoretical majority of 260 seats. But the Greens have many differences with 
the traditional left (and among themselves as well) on key questions, including 
the desirability of economic growth and further economic and political 
integration. On the other hand, "the left" is likely to agree on an acceleration 
of Parliament's already increasing emphasis on environmental and social 
issues. 
But while the Parliament may have seemed to move slightly more to the 
left, the "governing coalition", to the extent one exists, will likely be centrist. 
Ideologically-based majorities have been less important in the European 
Parliament than in national legislative bodies. Many votes, especially those 
having an impact on important national industrial or agricultural interests, 
are still decided more on national or regional lines than ideological ones that 
cut across nationalities. Moreover, the need to garner a minimum of 260 
votes to act on legislation, despite a substantial absenteeism rate at many 
sessions, has encouraged a spirit of compromise among the political groups. 
The leaders in this process have been the largest, most centrist and pro-
integration groups in the assembly: the European People's Party (Christian 
Democrats) and the Socialists. 
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THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
In the ten years since it was first popularly elected, the European 
Parliament has evolved from an almost purely consultative body to one having 
important legislative powers. It is likely for a variety of reasons that this 
trend will continue and may even be accelerated in the five-year term of the 
next Parliament. However, there are also a number of factors that may 
hinder this process. 
AN INCREASINGLY POWERFUL EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT? 
One factor that favors an increasing role for the Parliament is the push 
to complete the EC internal market by the end of 1992. The 1987 Single 
European Act laid out the 1992 plan and gave Parliament new powers, 
including the "cooperation procedure" under which the Parliament can accept, 
reject or amend laws proposed by the Commission to implement the 1992 
plan. The Parliament therefore has to act on a large body of legislation that, 
while often technical in nature, will have a great impact on important 
national interests of the member states and the lives of the 320 million people 
who live in the Community and on the interests of nations trading with the 
EC. 
While the 1992 plan will increase the power of all the Community 
institutions vis-a-vis the member states, the Parliament can expect an 
especially strong boost from the so-called "democratic deficit" paradox. Despite 
the democratic principles of the 12 EC states, EC institutions do not function 
very democratically; institutions traditionally seen as closest to popular 
concerns, the national legislatures- and the European Parliament, play only a 
small role in EC decision-making. The surveillance of national legislatures 
over the actions of government ministers participating in the EC Council of 
Ministers is quite lax in most countries. Moreover, the system of qualified 
majority voting instituted by the Single European Act means that legislation 
in certain areas could be passed by the Council against the wishes of a 
member country. Therefore, a national parliament's will can be frustrated 
even if it manages to impose its views on its government's ministers. Some 
observers believe a potential solution to the democratic deficit would be to 
expand the powers of the European Parliament, which devotes all its time to 
EC legislation and is directly elected by all the citizens of the Community. 
Another factor that favors an increased role for the European Parliament 
in the EC is the emergence of other issues that are seen as solvable only on 
a transnational basis. The foremost of these are environmental concerns. 
The Parliament profits especially from this trend, since it has already had a 
highly visible impact on EC environmental legislation, including most recently 
a successful attempt to toughen auto emission standards in the Community. 
The strong representation of the Greens in the new Parliament may have an 
effect similar to the "greening" effect in the national politics in the member 
states; the new ideas put forth by the Greens may alter the debate, even if 
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some of their proposals may be too radical for complete acceptance by the 
mainstream parties. 
Parliament's influence may also increase due to the recent improvement 
of its image. It has bad a reputation in Europe as a "gravy train" offering 
generous pay and benefits while demanding little substantive work, a dumping 
ground for political "has-beens", and a talking shop with a fondness for 
passing resolutions in areas, especially foreign policy, where it has little power 
or competence. But with the new powers it has received under the Single 
European Act, and the urgency imparted to European integration by the 1992 
plan, the Parliament and its image have begun to change. Absenteeism, a 
major problem that has both reduced public respect for the Parliament and 
hindered its effectiveness, has gone down markedly in the past year. In 
addition, the Parliament now devotes less time to voting on symbolic 
resolutions, spending about 80% of its time in committee carefully reviewing 
and acting on legislation. Those member countries who have taken a 
skeptical, wait-and-see attitude toward the Parliament's requests for more 
powers may be inclined to grant them to a more responsible body. 
Finally, the European Parliament is shedding its reputation as a dead-
end job for ambitious politicians, or at most a stepping-stone to higher posts 
back home. In the 1989 elections a considerable number of leading politicians 
ran for seats in the Parliament. In some countries where pro-EC sentiment 
is high (in the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy, for example), this is nothing 
new. But in France, for example, the election of former President Valery 
Giscard d'Estaing and President of the National Assembly and former Prime 
Minister Laurent Fabius to the Parliament is a significant event. Perhaps 
even more important for the Parliament's future is the increasing number of 
young politicians who are making their careers on the European level instead 
of the national one, because they believe a long-term shift is under way in 
decision-making away from the member states to European institutions. 
All these factors have prompted many in Europe's political elite to 
consider the European Parliament to be the Community's institution of the 
future. Commission President Jacques Delors has said he would prefer to be 
elected to his commissioner's post by the European Parliament rather than be 
appointed by the member governments. West German Chancellor Helmut 
Kohl has said that the Parliament will have gained powers approaching those 
of national parliaments by the end of its term in 1994. Whether these 
developments occur or not, they mark a change in the debate about the 
European Parliament which is more conducive to an expansion of its powers. 
FACTORS HINDERING A GROWTH IN THE PARLIAMENT'S 
POWERS 
If there are substantial reasons to expect the Parliament to play a more 
important role in EC institutions than at present, there are also factors that 
work against this evolution. Paradoxically, one may be the very dynamism 
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imparted to economic integration by the Single Act; the complex issues 
involved in implementing the 1992 plan may put institutional reform on the 
back burner. 
Another major hurdle Parliament faces is the low level of public 
participation in European elections when compared to national elections. 
This may tend to reduce the legitimacy of the Parliament's claim to be a truly 
representative institution.8 Moreover, the low turnout may be attributable to 
the public's ignorance of and lack of interest in an institution that is seen as 
having little power to affect their lives directly. The high abstention rate may 
be interpreted as a sign that Europeans simply do not want a stronger role 
for the European Parliament in EC institutions. 
There are also problems relating to the Parliament's institutional 
practices. The most obvious one is the Parliament's three "homes": full 
sessions in Strasbourg, committee meetings in Brussels and staff in 
Luxembourg. This arrangement hinders the Parliament's effectiveness and 
diminishes its credibility. The Parliament also. lacks cohesion. The 
Parliament's eight transnational "parties" are not as ideologically cohesive and 
disciplined as traditional national parties. There are 84 national parties 
represented in the new Parliament, several more than in the previous one. 
There are divisions along national and regional lines, as well as varying 
degrees of enthusiasm for the process of European integration. A careful 
search for consensus has therefore been necessary for the Parliament to be 
effective. In the last Parliament, the presence of Germans at the bead of both 
the Christian Democratic and Socialist groups, the two largest pro-integration 
groups in the Parliament, made this quest easier. This will not be the case 
in the new Parliament. Moreover, the expansion in importance of the Greens 
and the far right in the Parliament, groups more attuned to protest than 
compromise, may pose additional problems. 
In addition, the issues the new Parliament will face may be more divisive 
than those faced by previous Parliaments because of their importance for 
national interests as a result of the 1992 plan. They may also be more prone 
to left/right ideological disputes, especially those dealing with the construction 
of a "social Europe." But this clash of ideas and interests may not be entirely 
harmful; if it leads to greater ideological group cohesion, a more 
confrontational atmosphere might eventually make the Parliament more akin 
to national parliaments. 
8 European observers have pointed out that the turnout (58.5%), while 
low by the standards of national parliamentary elections in Europe, compares 
favorably to elections in the United States, even during Presidential elections 
years. In the Presidential election of 1988, 50.2% of the eligible voting age 
population cast ballots, while in 1986 the turnout was only 33.4%. See U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States. 
Washington: Bureau of the Census, 1989. p. 258. 
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A final obstacle to an increase in the Parliament's powers is the lack of 
consensus among member governments on the issue. For example, while the 
Italians and the Benelux countries are generally sympathetic to an e~pansion 
of Parliament's powers, the French and the Germans are less enthusiastic, 
while Denmark and Great Britain are frankly opposed. The most significant 
opposition is posed by Great Britain. In the European Parliament election 
campaign, Prime Minister Thatcher made clear her strong opposition to 
reducing British national sovereignty in favor of greater European integration. 
LIKELY CHANGES IN THE PARLIAMENT'S POWERS 
While the Parliament will probably increase in power in general terms 
both during its current five year mandate and in the longer term, . the various 
avenues for this change differ markedly in their likelihood. In the short term 
(i.e. the next five years) any major changes in the statutory powers of the 
Parliament are unlikely. The odds of sweeping changes in the longer term are 
harder to predict, since they depend on future developments that are 
themselves uncertain: the perceived success or failure of the 1992 plan, the 
degree to which the populations of EC member countries will see themselves 
as "European" as much as or more than they see themselves as French, Greek, 
British, etc., and the performance of the newly elected Parliament with the 
powers it has already. Any changes would also require amendment of the 
EC Treaty by unanimous consent of all the member states. Therefore, the 
current strong objections of several member states (especially Great Britain) 
to an extension of the Parliament's powers would have to be overcome. 
The best opportunity for the Parliament to expand its formal powers is 
when amendments are made to the Treaty in the early to mid-1990's to 
implement a plan for monetary union, since the 12 EC member states are 
unlikely to go to the trouble of opening the Treaty to amendments solely for 
the Parliament's benefit. Supporters of increased power for the Parliament 
could point out that monetary union, implemented without an increase in the 
Parliament's power, may sharpen the "democratic deficit" since control over 
national monetary and perhaps to a degree fiscal policies would shift to 
Brussels. The powers the 12 member states are likely to grant Parliament do 
not include the most important powers of national legislatures that impinge 
most directly on national sovereignty, because of the reluctance of most 
member governments to permit a radical devolution of power to a 
supranational body. Examples of these powers are the right to levy taxes and 
full power over the budget and over a European foreign policy. A power to 
initiate EC legislation (depending of course on what sort of legislation the 
Parliament is permitted to originate) may be less injurious to national 
sovereignty and could be therefore somewhat more likely in the long term. 
Most likely would be a full power of co-decision over EC legislation, because 
the present cooperation procedure is widely seen as a transitional half-
measure and because the Parliament already possesses this power in two 
areas: the admission of new members to the Community and the signing of 
association agreements with non-EC countries. 
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A more likely scenario for the next five years would be a Parliament that 
receives no new statutory powers, but increases its de facto influence by EC 
Court of Justice rulings that would interpret the Parliament's powers under 
the existing treaty in a more liberal manner. While the EC Court bas 
generally been cautious in this regard, at least one recent ruling may mark 
a tendency in this direction; the Court ruled that the Parliament as a whole 
could meet in extraordinary session in Brussels instead of Strasbourg. If the 
Parliament could move all its work to Brussels (over French and 
Luxembourgian objections) its effectiveness would be . considerably increased. 
Parliament's role in EC institutions is likely to increase simply because 
it will probably continue to use its current powers more assertively. Indeed, 
this has happened already; the Commission consults with Parliament when it 
is formulating its proposals in order to prevent a surprise delay or even 
rejection of legislation at later stages. It accepts many of Parliament's 
amt:?ndments at later stages for the same reason. The Parliament could also 
conceivably use its powers to hold up legislation that the Commission would 
like to see passed quickly in order to secure an informal agreement with the 
Commission on procedures that would increase its role in the legislative 
process. Finally, the Parliament is likely to gain respect for its investigative 
work. As Parliament's confidence and its workload increase its committee 
structure may become more elaborate and greater use may be made of outside 
experts and open hearings. Perhaps the most crucial issue is staffing. If the 
Parliament's operating budget is increased more member and committee staff 
would be available to examine legislation and do in-depth studies of issues of 
interest to the Parliament. 
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IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 
The push in Western Europe toward greater economic integration as 
embodied in the 1992 plan may have an important impact on U.S. political 
and economic interests in the region. While the EC's external economic 
relations are managed by the Commission, the Parliament bas an important 
role in the implementation of the 1992 plan that is likely to increase in its 
coming five-year term. Parliament's influence will be felt especially in areas 
such as product standards, domestic content rules and other EC legislation 
that could conceivably be used to build a feared "Fortress Europe."9 
Moreover, if Parliament becomes an increasingly popular (and populist) 
institution, it may be more inclined to protectionism, especially if it can seen 
as responding to concern for consumer-oriented issues, for example the 
environment and public health. The recent beef hormones dispute may be an 
indication of things to come. 10 On the other hand, it can be argued that a 
populist, consumer-oriented Parliament may be more open to low-cost imports 
and that it would therefore oppose barriers. In any case, the United States 
will have to deal with multiple decision centers in attempts to influence EC 
policy. This fact is already reflected in the increasing number of American 
law firms and corporate lobbyists who try to influence the European 
Parliament, especially during its committee meetings in Brussels. 
In the longer term, United States political and security interests are 
likely to be increasingly involved as . well, for moves toward economic 
integration create pressures for further political integration to manage the 
changes. In addition, the need for economic reform in Eastern Europe will 
lead to a greater foreign policy role for the EC. Parliament's role in these 
areas is limited at present, and will probably remain so for its current five-
year term, because they are at the heart of the touchy issues of national 
sovereignty. 
Parliament's most visible foreign policy powers at present are its veto 
power over new- applications to join the Community and over the 
establishment and renewal of association agreements with non-Community 
countries. The question of enlarging the EC beyond its present membership 
of 12 will probably be put off until 1993 at the earliest, so that the current 
membership can absorb the changes already underway. The power to veto 
association agreements is a power the Parliament can use more frequently. 
This power is sometimes used in ways that are in line with U.S. policy, 
9 See U.S. Congress. Congressional Research Service. European 
Community: Issues Raised by 1992 Integration, coordinated by Glennon 
Harrison. [Washington] May 31, 1989. CRS Report 89-323 E. 
10 See U.S. Congress. Congressional Research Service. U.S.-Community 
Trade Dispute over Meat Containing Growth Hormones, by Donna Vogt. 
[Washington] January 3, 1989. 12p. CRS 89-8. 
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sometimes in ways that conflict with it. An example of the latter was the 
rejection at first of a 1987 association agreement with Israel because of Israeli 
policy· in the occupied territories. The Parliament's foreign relations role 
includes the right to pose questions to the presidency of the European 
Political Cooperation, an intergovernmental consultative framework that 
attempts to build a European consensus on foreign policy issues. The 
Parliament also passes foreign policy resolutions, with special emphasis on 
human rights issues, and its Political Committee prepares comprehensive 
reports on European security questions. However, a true power of control for 
the Parliament over a European foreign policy seems at best a long-range 
possibility, since it would have to take place within the context of a politically 
integrated Europe. 
.. 
. , 
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CONGRESS AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
Congress's direct contacts with the European Parliament are quite limited 
at present; Members of Congress and the European Parliament meet twice a 
year, once in Europe and once in the United States. Members of Congress 
participating in these meetings have found them to be useful as a forum for 
an exchange of views on a wide variety of subjects, including trade, 
environmental, foreign policy and def ense issues. While the powers of the 
European Parliament will remain considerably weak.er than those of the U.S. 
Congress for the foreseeable future, the Parliament already bas a substantial 
impact on EC policies that interest Congress including the 1992 plan and the 
environment. But even if the Parliament's role in the EC were to remain 
limited in other areas, the influence these men and women have through their 
expertise and the personal connections they possess in their home countries 
and internationally make them valuable interlocutors for Members of 
Congress. Moreover, their status as directly elected representatives of 
Europeans may give Congress an especially good insight into European public 
opinion. 
In the longer term, if power in the Community shifts from the 
Commission and the Council to the Parliament and from the member states 
to the EC as a whole, these ties would be even more valuable. Congress could 
build on its institutional affinities with the Parliament to strengthen a 
natural line of communication independent of the executive branch with an 
important policy making body that increasingly deal with issues that are very 
important to U.S. interests. 
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